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very state in the United States with an income
tax offers some kind of tax break to its older
citizens. These breaks are often sizable, resulting in an elderly household owing substantially less in
income taxes than a non-elderly household with the
same income. In Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Michigan, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania, married
elderly households can have incomes well over $100,000
and not owe any state income taxes at all. Such tax
breaks come at considerable cost to state coffers, a cost
that is almost certain to grow as the elderly population
grows in both size and economic status. Yet there is
little evidence that these tax breaks are providing states
with any economic benefit, and the savings are skewed
toward those in little need of public support.
These tax breaks appear to be expanding. Since the
beginning of 2017, legislators in at least thirteen states
have proposed or established significant expansions:
• Laws eliminating all taxes on Social Security
income have been proposed in Vermont, Montana,
and Minnesota, with projected annual budget costs
of $30 million, $75 million, and approximately
$425 million, respectively. Laws that would go
further and exempt all pension income have been
proposed in Connecticut and Nebraska.
• In January, Arkansas began exempting all military
pension income from taxation, and similar laws
are being considered in at least six other states.
• After much debate last year, New Jersey enacted
legislation doubling the $20,000 exemption on
retirement income in 2017 and increasing it to
$100,000 by 2020.
These examples demonstrate the substantial size
of these tax breaks and their potential cost to state
governments in terms of foregone revenues. The
justifications typically given for these policies are that
elderly households are stretched financially and are in

need of these breaks, and that reducing the elderly’s
income taxes will make the state a more attractive
retirement destination, which is presumably good for
the economy. Among the recent arguments:
Too many people in New Jersey face retirement
with insecure incomes and too many retirees find
it hard to make ends meet on their income.
—NJ Senator Paul Sarlo, author of the bill to
increase the pension exemption1
These seniors are taking their pensions and fleeing
to Florida and other states that do not tax it, and
we want to keep them here where they pay taxes
and contribute to our community.
—NY State Senator Hugh Farley in 2016,
pushing legislation, which passed in June,
that would double the pension exemption to
$40,000 at an annual cost of $275 million2
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We want people to stay in
Connecticut and not leave for
lower-tax states that don’t tax
their pensions, especially our
senior citizens. This is an issue
of fairness.
—CT State Representative
Laura Devlin, proposing legislation in January
2017 exempting all Social
Security and pension
income from income taxes3
After describing how these tax
breaks work, this brief explores
whether there is convincing evidence to support these arguments.
We examine which taxpayers benefit
most from these tax breaks and
whether these policies are indeed
helping the most economically
vulnerable households. We then turn
to the costs of tax breaks in terms of
foregone state revenues and whether
the breaks affect elderly persons’
location decisions in such a way that
the tax breaks could, as some policy
makers assert, pay for themselves.

tax law. For higher-income households, up to 85 percent of benefits
are subject to federal income tax,
with the portion increasing with
income. The majority of states treat
Social Security benefits as tax-free
for all households, and the rest follow at least the federal tax rules.
On the third type of tax break,
exemptions for pension or other
retirement income, states differ from
the federal government, which taxes
all such income, and from each other.
It is also the tax break that has experienced the most growth. As shown
in Figure 1, in 2013 only twelve states
offered no exemption at all, while five
exempted all pension income and
another ten allow between $20,000
and $100,000 in pension income to
be exempt from taxation. Both the
number of states offering exemptions
and the size of the exemptions have
grown since 1990.
All three tax breaks tend to
benefit middle- and higher-income
taxpayers the most. Low-income

households owe little tax, even without these breaks, and these exemptions are not refundable (that is,
tax liabilities do not go below zero).
Because Social Security benefits
are based on earned income, they
tend to be larger for higher-income
households, and so a larger amount
is exempt. However, higher-income
households tend to receive a smaller
proportion of their income from
Social Security than do middle- or
lower-income households, as shown
in Figure 2 on page 4. Finally, the
tax savings from all three types are
greater the larger one’s marginal
tax rate, and since most states have
graduated income tax systems,
the tax savings from these policies
increase with income.
The full effect of these tax breaks
is more complicated than the level
of the exemptions and the marginal
tax rate because the policies are
often linked and the definitions of
retirement income vary. Some states
include Social Security benefits or

FIGURE 1. PENSION EXEMPTIONS AND CREDITS: 1990 AND 2013

Background and Our Tax
Measures
State income tax breaks for the elderly
typically fall into three categories (see
Box 1): (1) deductions, exemptions,
and credits given on the basis of age
(usually age 65 or over), (2) exemptions for Social Security benefits, and
(3) exemptions for pension or other
retirement income.
Deductions, exemptions, and
credits tend to be modest in size
and have tracked federal income tax
policy; thirty-five of the forty-four
states with income tax systems offer
some form of age-based tax break.
Likewise, Social Security benefits
are tax free for low-income households in all states and under federal
Source: Brewer, Conway, and Rork, 2016, Table 1.

C A R S E Y SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY

3

Box 1: Three Tax Breaks for Seniors and How They Work
1. Deductions, exemptions, and
credits given on the basis of age
(usually 65 and over)
• Exemptions and deductions are
subtracted from taxable income,
which reduces the tax liability
by the amount of the exemption
or deduction times the individual’s tax rate.
• Credits are subtracted from the
tax liability, and reduce the tax
liability dollar for dollar. If the
credit is refundable, the tax liability can be negative, such that the
household receives a payment
from the government. Age credits are generally not refundable.
Example: The Johnsons have a taxable income of $50,000, on which
they pay 10 percent in taxes, or
$5,000.
If they can claim an age exemption
or deduction of $2,000, their taxable
income is now $48,000, and they
will pay $4,800 in taxes. The exemption/deduction saved them $5,0004,800 = $200, or the amount of the
exemption ($2,000) times the tax
rate (0.10) they would have paid on
that $2,000. Key implications are:
• If the Johnsons had faced a
higher marginal tax rate, the
exemption would have saved
them even more in taxes; for
example, if their tax rate was 0.25,
they would save $500 in taxes.
• In most tax systems, the marginal tax rate increases with
taxable income; therefore, the
tax savings from deductions and
exemptions tend to be largest for
the highest-income households.

• If the Johnsons’ taxable income or
tax liability was zero initially, the
exemption/deduction would be of
no benefit to them.
Turning to credits, if they can claim
an age credit equal to $2,000, they
will pay $5,000-2,000 = $3,000 in
taxes. The credit saved them $2,000.
If they can claim an age credit equal
to $6,000, they will owe $5,0006,000 = minus $1,000 in taxes. If the
credit is refundable they will receive
a $1,000 payment from the government.If it is nonrefundable, they
will simply owe no taxes.
2. Exemption of Social Security
benefits
For federal taxes, benefits are
excluded for single/married households with provisional income below
$25,000/32,000. Households with
incomes above those thresholds must
include a portion of their benefits in
their federally taxable income; the
portion increases as income rises, up
to a maximum of 85 percent. Even
for the highest-income households,
15 percent of benefits are exempt
from income taxation.
States treat Social Security benefits in three ways: (1) they don’t
tax them at all, (2) they follow the
federal law, or (3) they include some
benefits in taxable income for highincome households but at a lower
rate than federal law.
3. Exemption of pension or
retirement income
Many states exclude a certain
amount of pension income from
taxable income. These policies differ
across states in:

• the amount of income that can
be excluded (see Figure 1)
• the definition of pension
income, ranging from very
broad (including Social Security,
wages, dividends, and interest)
to narrow (only defined benefit
pensions)
• the availability to high-income
households, as exemptions are
sometimes phased out with
income
Just as with the age-based exemptions, the tax savings from exempting Social Security benefits and
pension income is larger for highincome households than for other
households because high-income
households typically face a higher
marginal tax rate and they owe
enough taxes to be able take advantage of the reduction. Only a nonrefundable tax credit provides the
same tax savings to all households.
Availability of senior exemptions, deductions, and credits
Of the 44 states with income tax
systems:

35 offer an extra exemption,

deduction, or credit based on age.

29 exempt all Social Security
benefits from taxation.

5 states fully exempt pension/

retirement income from taxation.

27 states exempt some pension/

retirement income from taxation or
offer tax credits for pension income.
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FIGURE 2. 2013 INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF ELDERLY HOUSEHOLDS, BY SOURCE*

Box 2. Measuring the Benefits
for Taxpayers Age 65-Plus
Our calculated tax benefit measures the difference in the estimated state income tax liability
a household would face if it was
elderly or not. It is constructed for
households at three points in the
income distribution—bottom 25
percent, median, and top 10 percent. The measures are constructed
according to the following steps:

Note: This figure is not to scale. Source: 2013 American Community Survey for married households with at
least one member over age 65

even some earned income in their
definition of the retirement income
that can be exempt, while others
phase out the exemptions for highincome households or exempt only
defined-benefit pension income.
We therefore create a summary
measure of the tax benefits of being
an elderly household for a variety of
income levels and in every state, using
household income data from the
American Community Survey (ACS)
and the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) TAXSIM calculator (see Box 2).4 We also use the ACS
and decennial census data to provide
information on the distribution and
composition of income for elderly
and non-elderly households.

Distributional and
Revenue Effects
The financial need argument for
these tax breaks presumes that the
elderly are a relatively needy group
and that the tax breaks target the
most economically vulnerable
among them. Our research casts
doubt on both notions.

Historically, the elderly have had
lower median incomes than the
non-elderly, but this pattern has
changed dramatically in the last 20
years.5 While the average married,
elderly household had total income
equal to 64 percent of that of nonelderly households in 1990, by 2013
that percentage had grown to 101
percent (that is, elderly households
had slightly higher incomes). The
data also show that the elderly
have experienced a much smaller
increase in income inequality than
the non-elderly during this period.
Some elderly households no
doubt still experience substantial
financial difficulties, especially those
headed by single females (often
widows). Do these tax breaks help
those households? The answer is no,
for several reasons. Most of these
households’ income comes from
Social Security benefits, which at
these low income levels would not
be subject to even federal income
tax. Even if benefits were taxable,
in most states these households
would face little or no income tax
because of their very low incomes,

1. 2013 ACS data are used to
identify the level and sources of
income for elderly households
at the three income levels.
2. NBER’s TAXSIM calculator
is used to estimate the state
income tax liability these
households would face in
every state with an income
tax, given the level and
sources of income.
This step creates the current
tax liability for the three elderly
household types for every state.
3. To simulate the tax liability for
these households if they were
not elderly, TAXSIM recalculates the tax liability removing
any age-based exemptions,
deductions, or credits and
switching all sources of
retirement income into other
income (which has no special
exemptions).
This step creates the tax
liability for the three elderly
household types for every state
if they were not elderly.
4. Subtracting #2 from #3
yields the amount by which
the estimated tax liability is
lower because the household
is over age 65 and receives
income from retirement
income sources.
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regardless of their age. In fact, to
the extent that they receive income
from wages, some of these very low
income households are actually
harmed by their age because after age
65 they are no longer eligible for the
often refundable Earned Income Tax
Credit. To sum up, neither federal
nor state income tax breaks targeting the elderly offer much help to the
lowest-income households because
these households would owe little or
no income tax without them. To help
these groups would require enacting
refundable tax breaks or credits.
Our estimated tax benefit measures, summarized in Table 1 and
Figure 3, underscore these conclusions. Elderly households in the
bottom 25 percent of the income distribution pay very little state income
taxes, with an average of negative $10
under current tax policy. Removing
all state tax breaks, which includes
the extreme policy change of making
all Social Security benefits taxable,
leads to a $131 average increase per
year. Note that going in the other
direction—that is, expanding existing
tax breaks—would have little if any
effect on their tax liability because
such breaks are not refundable.
It is the middle- and high-income
elderly who benefit most from current tax policy, and proposals to
expand these tax breaks primarily
benefit the highest-income taxpayers
since the proposals would exempt
even larger amounts of income.
Elderly households at the median pay
$809 less on average than if they were
non-elderly, which results in them
paying about 69 percent of what
non-elderly households of the same
income level pay. This tax benefit
varies widely across the states, from
zero in Tennessee (a state without a
broad-based income tax) to $1,668 in
Georgia. Figure 3 on page 6 shows a
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TABLE 1. STATE TAX BENEFITS FOR MARRIED ELDERLY HOUSEHOLDS AT
THREE INCOME LEVELS IN 2013
Variable

Bottom 25%
of income

Median
income

Top 10%
of income

$18,000

$37,400

$129,700

-$10

$1,865

$12,452

Maximum

$33 (IL)

$6,378 (DC)

$24,867 (DC)

Minimum

-$137 (NM)

$343 (TN)

$3,194 (NH)

$131

$809

$1,510

Maximum

$395 (IN)

$1,668 (GA)

$5,220 (GA)

Minimum

$0 (NH)

$0 (TN)

$63 (NH)

Household income

1. Current estimated tax liability for elderly households
State average

2. Estimated change in tax liability if tax breaks removed
State average

3. Elderly tax liability as a percentage of the non-elderly tax liability [(1 divided by (1+2)) x 100]
State average

NA

69%

89%

Maximum

NA

100% (TN)

100% (TN)

Minimum

NA

42% (GA)

63% (GA)

Note: The percentage in panel 3 for the lowest-income households is not useful since the tax liabilities are often
negative. Source: American Community Survey and National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM calculator.

geographic pattern to these breaks,
in which the southeastern and
central Midwestern states offer the
biggest tax benefits and the Plains,
California, and upper Atlantic seaboard offer the least.
While the top 10 percent pay
almost 90 percent of what a nonelderly household of the same
income level pays, they still
receive a sizable benefit on average
($1,510), and recent and currently
proposed expansions would benefit
them the most. For example, in past
work we estimate that a 2010 law in
Georgia that would have increased
the retirement exemption from
$65,000 to $100,000 in 2013 would
have had no benefit for the bottom
75 percent of the income distribution.6 And because the tax liabilities are large in dollar terms, this
change would have cost Georgia
$100 million in tax revenues.
More generally, we estimate
that the revenue costs of these tax

breaks are often substantial. On
average, the income tax revenues
raised from elderly households
would be 50 percent higher if all
tax breaks were removed, equivalent to about 7 percent of all state
income tax revenues. This percentage will almost surely increase as
the population ages, which census
data show has not yet occurred but
soon will. (The elderly make up
18.4 percent of the adult population
in each state on average, according
to ACS data, a percentage that has
barely increased since 1990; however, the Census Bureau projects
the proportion of the elderly in the
population to increase by nearly
50 percent between 2010 and
2030).7 Our calculations therefore
underestimate the likely revenue
impact of these policies in the
years to come. In addition, these
average impacts mask large variation across the states. Some states,
such as Delaware (11.5 percent),
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FIGURE 3: ELDERLY TAX LIABILITY AS A PERCENTAGE OF NON-ELDERLY TAX LIABILITY, MEDIAN INCOME, MARRIED
HOUSEHOLDS, 2013

Source: American Community Survey and National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM calculator

Georgia (12 percent), Kentucky
(11 percent), Michigan (14 percent), Mississippi (12.6 percent),
Pennsylvania (11.7 percent), and
South Carolina (14.6 percent), lose
far more than 7 percent of their
income tax revenues to these tax
breaks (see Box 3). These states
are the ones that grant the largest
pension exemptions and so serve as
a benchmark for those states currently considering the large expansions mentioned above (including
Connecticut, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New York,
and Vermont).

Our research therefore suggests
that current tax breaks primarily
benefit the middle- and upperincome elderly and that further
expansions, as currently proposed,
would benefit primarily the highestincome households. These tax
breaks also come at a significant
cost to the state in terms of revenues. Policy advocates often argue
that such tax breaks will “pay for
themselves” by encouraging the
elderly to remain in the state and by
enticing more elderly to locate in
the state—an assertion that brings
us to the next section.

Box 3: Revenue Foregone
From Tax Breaks for the Elderly
50% = the average amount that
income tax revenues from elderly
households would increase if all
current tax breaks were removed.
7% = the amount of total state
income tax revenues forgone due
to current state tax breaks for the
elderly. This amount is far higher
in some states:
• Delaware–11.5%
• Georgia–12%
• Kentucky–11%
• Michigan–14%
• Mississippi–12.6%
• Pennsylvania–11.7%
• South Carolina–14.6%
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Do These Policies Affect
Migration?
Elderly persons do not move
between states that often: less than
1 percent of the population age 65
and over moves across state lines
in any given year. Moreover, that
number has been fairly steady over
the last few decades and has been
declining, if anything.8 Such a low
rate of migration casts doubt on
assertions such as those quoted
above that the elderly are fleeing or
flocking to states because of taxes.
This low overall rate masks
important variations across states,
however, and policies could still
be influencing the decisions of the
small percent who do move. Table 2
shows the top fifteen net receivers of
elderly migrants and the top fifteen
net senders (or “winners” versus
“losers”). Not surprisingly, the top
receivers tend to be Southern states
with temperate climates, a low cost
of living, and many natural amenities. These states also tend to have
lower income tax burdens and large
tax breaks for seniors (see Figure
3). The reverse is also true in that
the top senders tend to be Northern
states with higher costs of living and
heavier tax burdens. Given these
broad differences between receiving
and sending states, just how much
of these migration patterns can we
attribute to tax policy? Is it Florida’s
weather or its lack of an income tax
that makes it a draw for retirees?
Studying the relationship between
changes in tax policy and changes in
migration patterns allows researchers to better isolate the effects of
tax policy from other state amenities such as climate, cost of living,
and quality of life. We conducted
a formal investigation into this
relationship in a recent work.9

TABLE 2. TOP NET RECEIVERS AND
NET SENDERS OF ELDERLY MIGRANTS
IN 2010

Note: * Denotes that the state was also in the top 15 in
the 1990 census. The “net rate” is the number of net
elderly migrants (in-migrants minus out-migrants) over
a five-year period, divided by the state’s elderly population, multiplied by 100. The sample is limited to the 48
contiguous states. Source: 2006–2010 American Community Survey and Conway and Rork, 2016, Table 2.

Using four decades of decennial
census data, we estimated regression models of elderly migration
that control for other factors that
could affect migration, such as
weather and natural amenities, cost
of living, unemployment rates, and
other state policies and programs
of interest to the elderly (like estate
taxes and spending on hospitals).10
We estimated several variants of this
model, measuring the tax breaks
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in different ways to ensure that
our results were not sensitive to
one specification or variable. The
models were also estimated for the
high-income (top 25 percent) and
low-income (bottom 25 percent)
elderly separately, as we would
expect the tax policies to have the
stronger effect on the high-income
elderly. Across all of these analyses,
we failed to find any statistically
significant effect of these income tax
breaks on elderly migration.
A limitation of this work is that
it ends in 2000. In the 2000s, the
decennial census long form—the
largest source of migration data—
was replaced with the annual
American Community Survey. The
ACS is a smaller dataset with a different survey process and different
definitions of both residence and
migration than the census long form,
and the change in the form used
makes extending our earlier analyses
into the 2000s difficult.11 To ascertain whether our earlier findings of
no meaningful effect extend to the
2000s, we perform two exercises.
First, we return to Table 2 and
compare the migration patterns
in 1990 versus 2010. Income tax
breaks for the elderly have changed
a lot during this time, while elderly
migration patterns have been quite
stable. For instance, thirteen of the
top fifteen receivers in Table 2 were
also top receivers in 1990; similarly,
nine of the top fifteen senders in
Table 2 were also top senders in
1990. The fact that such tax policies have changed a great deal while
elderly migration has not is a simple
yet convincing piece of evidence
that senior tax breaks are not a driving factor in location decisions.
Second, we make some back-ofthe-envelope calculations of the
costs of using these tax breaks to
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recruit the elderly under a bestcase scenario. We begin with the
extremely optimistic assumption
that all elderly migrants are moving because of income tax breaks
and then calculate what each of
those migrants “cost,” on average,
in terms of foregone tax revenues.
In 2012, 43.1 million people were
over age 65. Applying a high rate
of migration (1 percent) by historical standards to this number yields
an estimated 431,000 migrants. We
estimate that existing tax breaks cost
the states $30.1 billion in 2012, or
$69,837 per migrant. This exercise
suggests that existing tax breaks cost
the states nearly $70,000 per elderly
migrant whom they could potentially recruit. To put this number
in context, note that the median
income of an elderly person was
less than $25,000 in 2012. These
migrants would therefore have to
generate economic benefits almost
three times the size of their annual
incomes for these tax breaks to “pay
for themselves.” This high cost per
potential migrant is not surprising
given the low level of migration
combined with the sizable revenue
costs of these tax breaks. And if
migrants are not much affected by
tax breaks, as empirical evidence
suggests, the cost of each migrant
actually recruited by tax policy is far
higher and therefore even less likely
to be offset by any economic benefits generated. In sum, we conclude
that it is highly unlikely that these
tax breaks pay for themselves.

Conclusion
Policies that reduce the state income
taxes owed by elderly households
are widespread and come in many
forms. Such tax breaks result in
elderly households paying substantially less in income taxes than nonelderly households with the same
income, and the tax breaks come at
a significant cost in terms of foregone revenues. And yet many states
are currently considering expanding
these breaks. The primary reasons
given by proponents of such expansions are that the elderly are an
especially needy group of taxpayers and that such tax breaks will
prevent the elderly from fleeing to
other states with lower taxes.
This brief provides evidence refuting both of these arguments. As a
group, the elderly now have similar
incomes and actually experience less
income inequality than non-elderly
households. Moreover, expanding
these tax breaks will do little to help
the most economically vulnerable
among the elderly because such
households already pay almost
nothing in income taxes under current policy. Increasing the amount
of pension or Social Security benefits that are exempt would instead
help only those elderly much higher
up in the income distribution. Our
analyses further suggest that if state
policy makers really want to help
the poorest elderly households,
they could consider extending the
refundable Earned Income Tax
Credit to those over age 65 or enacting some other kind of refundable
low-income tax credit such that the
household could actually receive a
payment from the government.

The idea that such tax breaks
pay for themselves by attracting
retirees into the state or discouraging existing residents from leaving
also finds little support. Census
data show that elderly migration is
a fairly rare event, with a pattern of
movement that has remained stable
for decades, despite many new
tax breaks designed to attract the
elderly. Our formal analyses likewise provide no consistent evidence
that these tax breaks influence
migration decisions in a meaningful
way. Even if we cast this evidence
aside and instead use extremely
optimistic assumptions about the
impact on migration, these tax
breaks seem highly unlikely to pay
for themselves.
If such tax breaks are expanded,
our analyses suggest that higherincome households will be the
primary beneficiaries and that the
change will do little to stem the
flow of retirees leaving the state.
Moreover, those foregone tax revenues must somehow be paid for,
presumably through cuts to spending—spending that could help the
needy elderly or improve economic
growth—or through increases in
other taxes and fees.
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